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NOTES
JUST SAY THE "MAGIC WORDS": ADVOCATING AN
ARBITRATION CLAUSE SHOULD BE HELD TO AN
EXPRESS WAIVER STANDARD FOR THE DOCTRINE
OF INDIAN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - C&L
ENTERPRISES V. CITIZEN BAND POTAWATOMI
INDIAN TRIBE
Jeremy Clinefelter*
L Introduction
Under normal circumstances, when two parties agree to an arbitration
clause in a construction contract, executed on privately owned land, both
parties may reasonably be assured of a speedy resolution to any dispute
arising thereon. Circumstances change, however, if one of the parties is a
federally recognized Indian tribe. Indian tribes, like States and the Federal
Government, possess sovereign immunity from suit, which throws a real
wrench into the resolution of any dispute arising from a contract. Nearly a
decade after the contract in this case was executed, the parties may finally
be nearing a resolution.
In Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. C&L Enterprises,' the
parties executed a roof construction contract. A dispute arose and C&L
Enterprises (C&L) sought resolution pursuant to the arbitration clause
written into the contract.2 Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma
(Citizen Band) maintained it was immune from suit by virtue of its
sovereign immunity.3 The issue of Citizen Band's immunity from suit
progressed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which ultimately
resulted in a dismissal of C&L's claim by the state court.4 This dismissal
did not end the dispute, however, because the Supreme Court had ruled that
an Indian tribe could waive its sovereign immunity and therefore, C&L
challenged the state court's ruling on that issue.'
*Third-year law student, Hamline University School of Law. This note was accepted for
publication in the spring of 2001.
I. See Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. C&L Enters., Inc., No. 86,568 (Okla. Ct.
App. Feb. 8, 2000) (Citizen Band Potawatomi 11), available at http://oklegal.onenet.net.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id., No. 86,568, slip op. at 2.
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The Supreme Court must determine whether an arbitration clause in a
contract between an Indian tribe and a non-Indian party constitutes waiver
of tribal sovereign immunity from suit.' To make this determination the
Court should also endorse either an express or implied standard of waiver.7
This note examines the issue of tribal waiver from suit.' Specifically this
note argues that waiver of tribal immunity should be unequivocally
expressed.9 This note also proposes that in order to meet an express
standard arbitration clauses in contracts between Indian tribes and non-
Indians should contain not the "magic words," but the "magic factors" -
a written declaration identifying the Indian tribe's consent; a specified forum
to resolve disputes; and consent to judgment in the specified forum."0
H1. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
In August 1993, the Citizen Band and C&L entered into a construction
contract." The contract called for C&L to construct a roof on a building
already under construction for Citizen Band." The execution of the
contract took place outside of Indian country 3 and was determined to be
6. See id.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
8. See discussion infra Part III.B-C., IV.B-D.
9. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.D, IV.E.
11. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 1. The contract was written
upon a copyrighted American Institute of Architects form calling for C&L to construct the roof
for $85,000. See Respondent's Brief at 6, C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 377 (2000) (No. 00-292). Citizen Band notes that only three of the five
Potawatomi Business Committee, which conducts and authorizes business transactions on behalf
of the Nation pursuant to the article VII, section 2 of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation Constitution.
See Respondents Brief at 6 n.6, C&L Enterprises (No. 00-292). C&L contends that Citizen Band
or its architect chose and drafted the AIA Agreement. See Petitioner's Brief at 6, C&L Enterprises
(No. 00-292).
12. See Citizen Band Potawatomi I, No. 86,568, slip op. at 1. Citizen Band is a federally
recognized Indian tribe. See id.
13. Congress defines Indian Country as follows:
[Tihe term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the
limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within
the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Although 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines Indian country for cases disputing
criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the definition for
questions of civil jurisdiction as well. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427
[Vol. 25
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a commercial endeavor of Citizen Band. 4 After execution of the contract
Citizen Band decided on a different roof design." Soon thereafter, Citizen
Band awarded the contract to construct the new roof to another
contractor. 6 C&L then sought relief through arbitration pursuant to the
terms of the contract. 1 After the arbitrator ruled in its favor, C&L brought
an action to confirm. the award.' Citizen Band defended the action by
claiming immunity to suit and moved to dismiss." When the state trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, Citizen Band generally refrained from
appearing in the lawsuit." Citizen Band appealed the trial court's ruling to
uphold the arbitrator's award."
(1975); accord McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.17 (1973);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-22 nn.5, 6, 10 (1958). The test for determining whether land
is Indian country hinges on whether the land was validly set aside for the Indians by the Federal
Government. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 511 (1991); see also Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 125 (1993)
(quoting FEux CoHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 34 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982) ("The intent of Congress, as elucidated by [Supreme Court] decisions, was to designate as
Indian country all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of tribal Indians under
federal protection, together with trust and restricted Indian allotments.")).
14. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 1.
15. See id. Citizen Band contends it changed from a foam roof to a rubber guard roof, after
it learned birds had eaten holes in a similar foam roof elsewhere. See Respondents Brief at 7,
C&L Enterprises (No. 00-292). Citizen Band further contends it went with a new contractor
because C&L could not construct the rubber guard roof and subcontracted the job out resulting
in a bid $21,616 more than the contractor with the lowest bid. See id. "The breach occurred
before the bank construction had progressed to the point of installing the roof and prior to C&L
being given a notice to proceed under the Contract." Petitioner's Brief at 6, C&L Enterprises (No.
00-292).
16. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 1.
17. See id. The contract contained an arbitration clause which reads as follows:
All claims or disputes between the Contractor and the Owner arising out [of] or
relating to the Contract, or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration in
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association .... The award rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators
shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it in accordance with applicable
law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.... The agreement herein among the
parties to the Agreement and any other written agreement to arbitrate referred to
herein shall he specifically enforceable under applicable law in any court having
jurisdiction thereof.
Petitioner's Brief at App. 46, Art. 10.8, C&L Enterprises (No. 00-292).
18. See Citizen Band Potawatomi I1, No. 86,568, slip op. at 2. "The arbitrator awarded C&L
approximately twenty-nine percent of the contract price as damages and also awarded attorney
fees." Id. "The arbitrator rendered its award in favor of C&L in the amount of $25,400.00 plus
attorney's fees of $2,230.00, costs of $34.67 and arbitration fees of $750.00." Petitioner's Brief
at 7, C&L Enterprises (No. 00-292).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 2.
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B. Oklahoma District Court of Oklahoma County
On August 7, 1995, C&L filed its Summons and Petition for a breach of
contract action in the District Court of Oklahoma County. ' Citizen Band
moved to dismiss the action on August 25, 1995.' The trial court overruled
Citizen Band's motion on September 22, 1995, after both parties had
submitted briefs on the issue of sovereign immunity.' On October 27,
1995, the district court confirmed the arbitration award for C&L.'
C. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Second Division
The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma upheld the ruling of the District Court
of Oklahoma County on November 5, 1996.0 In an unpublished decision,
the court found Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe' dispositive of the issue, whether
"a contract between an Indian tribe and a non-Indian is enforceable in state
court when the contract is executed outside of Indian Country."' Neither
party disputed that the execution of the contract did not take place on either
trust or reservation land." Thus, in light of Hoover 1, the Court of Appeals
of Oklahoma affirmed the state trial court ruling in all regards?
22. See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, No. CJ-1995-5204 (Okh. Co.
Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 7, 1995).
23. See C&L, No. CJ-1995-5204 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. filed Aug. 25, 1995).
24. See C&L, No. CJ-1995-5204 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. filed Sep. 22, 1995).
25. See C&L, No. CJ-1995-5204 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 27, 1995).
26. See Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. C&L Enters., Inc., No. 86,568 (Okla. Ct.
App. Nov. 5, 1996) (Citizen Band Potawatomi 1), available at http://oklegal.onenet.net.
27. 909 P.2d 59 (Okla. 1995) (Hoover 1). The Hoover case arrived at the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma on appeal from a state trial court's judgment that it could not exercise state jurisdiction
over the Kiowa Tribe because of the Tribe's sovereign immunity. See id at 60-61. The Plaintiff,
Robert M. Hoover, filed the action when the Kiowa Tribe failed to make any payments on a
promissory note of $142,500, that had been executed off the reservation, for which the Tribe
pledged 5000 shares of common stock. See id at 60. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed
and remanded in line with the Supreme Court of New Mexico's ruling in Padilla v. Pueblo of
Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (1988), which "held that the exercise ofjurisdiction over a sovereign Indian
tribe for off-reservation conduct was solely a matter of comity." See Hoover 1, 909 F.2d at 61.
The court reasoned that since Oklahoma permitted breach of contract suits against the state, an
Indian tribe's sovereign immunity would not bar suit on a contract executed outside Indian
country. See id. at 61. The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma relied on Hoover I to reach two
unpublished decisions relevant here - Citizens Band Potawatomi I and Manufacturing
Technologies Inc. v. Kiowa Tribe. See Manufacturing Technologies, No. 86,489 (Okla. Ct. App.
June 28, 1996), available at http://legal.onenet.net; see also discussion infra Part HI.A.2. On
remand the trial court ruled against the Kiowa Tribe and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
affirmed, adding detail to its rationale in Hoover L See Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe, 957 P.2d 81
(Okla. 1998) (Hoover 11).
28. Citizen Band Potawatomi I, No. 86,568 (1996).
29. See id.
30. See id. Citizen Band filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma while its appeal to the higher state courts was pending. See Citizen Band
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D. Supreme Court of the United States
On June 1, 1998, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Citizen
Band's petition for a writ of certiorari.' Moreover, the Court vacated and
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma for further
consideration in light of Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.32
E. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Second Division
The Court of Appeals of Oklahoma did not receive the case for review
pursuant to the reversal and remand until January 7, 2000." Initially, the
court had to review its earlier decision in Potawatomi I in light of the
Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Freeman, No. 95-CV-1967T (W.D. Okla. filed Dec. 14, 1995). The
district court held that the state action provided an adequate opportunity to raise federal issues
and dismissed on abstention grounds pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See
Freeman, No. CIV-95-1967-T (W.D. Okla. filed Aug. 6, 1996). The Tribe appealed the district
court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which filed an
unpublished opinion on May 8, 1997. See Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Freeman, No. 96-6279,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10566, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit described the procedural
history as follows:
At the present time, the state trial court has entered judgment for C&L over the
Nation's sovereign immunity objection; the Oklahoma Court of Appeals has
affirmed that judgment . . . ; and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has denied
certiorari .... In short, ... the substance of the case, in particular the Nation's
entitlement to tribal sovereign immunity, has been finally and unequivocally
resolved.
See id. at *4. As such, the issue of the district court's abstention order no longer took center
stage. See id. Rather, the Tenth Circuit determined that "the current availability of any federal
relief for the Nation turns on the preclusive effect accorded the state courts' determination of its
sovereign immunity claim .... " See id. The Tenth Circuit remanded the cause for a
determination on that issue. See Citizens Potawatomi Nation v. Freeman, 113 F.3d 1245 (10th
Cir. 1997). Both parties then submitted briefs on the preclusive effect of the state court judgment
to the district court. See Freeman, No. CIV-95-1967T (W.D. Okla. filed Aug. 1, 1997; Sep. 2,
1997; Sep. 19, 1997). Finally, the district court ordered an administrative closing of the file on
January 21, 2000, pending the state court action. Freeman, No. CIV-95-1967-T (W.D. Okla. filed
Jan. 21, 2000).
31. See Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. C&L Enters., Inc., 524 U.S. 901 (1998).
32. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). The Court's decision in Manufacturing Technologies affected
several Oklahoma Indian sovereignty cases, including the eventual overturning of Citizens Band
of Potawatomi I in Citizens Band of Potawatomi I1, but also a series surrounding the Kiowa
Tribe's promissory note endeavors. See discussion infra Part II.E; see also Hoover v. Kiowa
Tribe, 986 P.2d 516, 517 (Okla. 1999) (Hoover 11l) (overruling Hoover HI after reconsideration
of the ruling in Manufacturing Technologies); Aircraft Equip. Co. v. Kiowa Tribe, 975 P.2d 450,
451 (Okla. 1998) (overruling a previous affirmation of state jurisdiction enforcing a money
judgment against the Kiowa Tribe in light of Manufacturing Technologies); Carl E. Gungoll
Exploration Joint Venture v. Kiowa Tribe, 975 P.2d 442, 444 (Okla. 1998) (holding that the
Manufacturing Technologies opinion directly contradicts the court's earlier legal approach to
sovereign immunity in Hoover 1I and Aircraft Equipment and therefore, the Kiowa Tribe's
sovereign immunity protected it from suit by creditors to recover money on promissory notes).
33. See Citizen Band Potawatomi 11, No. 86,568 (2000).
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Supreme Court's decision in Manufacturing Technologies.4 Faced with that
ruling directly on point, the court had little choice but to find the trial court
lacked jurisdiction since Citizen Band's sovereign immunity from suit
extended to a contract executed outside Indian Country? However, the
Manufacturing Technologies decision also provided that a tribe may waive
its sovereign immunity?' Therefore, the court embarked upon an
examination of whether Citizen Band waived its immunity through the
arbitration clause in the contract with C&L.
The court held that the record did not support a finding of express waiver
of immunity by Citizen Band. In reaching its decision, the court found
C&L's argument- that Citizen Band waived its immunity from suit in clear
and unequivocal terms through the agreement to arbitrate and the specific
language of the contract - "persuasive."3 Furthermore, the court believed
the Alaska Supreme Court's logic in Native Village of Eyak v. GC
Contractors,4 a case directly on point, to be "unassailable."'" However, the
court declined to find an "unequivocally expressed" waiver, as required by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez.' C&L urged the Court to follow the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's holding in United States v. Oregon,"3 and
find the contract language a sufficient expression of Citizen Band's waiver."
Instead, the court cited American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium, Inc.
v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's as a case where other courts refrained from
extending the scope of an express waiver to the extent of the Oregon
court.4' Ultimately, although the language of the contract seemed to
"indicate a willingness on Tribe's part to expose itself to suit," the court
found that willingness based on an "implication" rather than an "unequivocal
expression."'7 On this rationale, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma reversed
and remanded to the trial court with instructions to sustain Citizen Band's
motion to dismiss.
48
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. C&L Enters., Inc., No. 86,568, slip op. at
2 (Okla. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2000) (Citizen Band Potawatomi 11).
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. 658 P.2d 756 (Alaska 1983); see also infra Part 1II.C.1.
41. See Citizen Band Potawatomi 11, No. 86,568, slip op. at 3.
42. 436 U.S. 49 (1978); see also infra Part III.A.I.
43. 657 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1981); see also infra Part Ill.B.3.
44. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 3.
45. 780 F.2d 1374 (8th Cir. 1985); see also infra Part III.B.4.
46. See Citizen Band Potawatomi II, No. 86,568, slip op. at 3.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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F. Supreme Court of the United States (II)
On October 30, 2000, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
C&L's petition for certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma,
Second Division 9
IlL Background
The issue before the Supreme Court of the United States in Potawatomi
I1 is whether the arbitration clause in the contract between Citizen Band and
C&L constituted a waiver of tribal immunity from suit.' Before focusing
on the Potawatomi 1I issue, it will be helpful for the reader to make a brief
acquaintance with the historical and current state of the doctrine of tribal
immunity."' Therefore, this note briefly touches on the doctrine of tribal
immunity." It then proceeds to a thorough development of the case law
involving Indian waiver of immunity from suit. 3 Finally, this note sets out
in detail the cases asking whether an arbitration clause in a contract between
an Indian tribe and non-Indian constitutes tribal waiver of immunity from
suitY
A. Doctrine of Tribal Immunity - Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court has recognized that tribal sovereign immunity is a
creation of the judiciary, attributed in several cases to Turner v. United
States.5" In 1940, the Court solidified the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in United States v. USF&G,' by recognizing that Indian nations retain
immunity from suit." The Court ushered the doctrine into the modem era
49. See C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 377 (2000).
50. See Citizens Band Potawatomi I1, No. 86,568, slip op. at 2. The Oklahoma Court of
Appeals stated that "because the Court in Manufacturing Technologies recognized that a tribe may
waive its sovereign immunity, this court must determine if such a waiver occurred in this
instance." See id.
51. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
52. See discussion infra Part III.A.
53. See discussion infra Part III.B.
54. See discussion infra Part III.C.
55. 248 U.S. 354 (1919). In Turner, three bands of Creek Indians tore down an eighty-mile
fence constructed at considerable expense by the plaintiff. See id. at 356. The plaintiff sought
relief, but the Court noted that "like other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek
Nation was free from liability for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure
to keep the peace." Id. at 357-58. Furthermore, the Court showed that liability would normally
be imposed by statute, but Congress had not addressed such liability for an Indian tribe. See id.
at 358. Additionally, the Court opined that the lack of a "substantive right" for plaintiff, not
sovereign immunity, was the problem. Id. at 358. Finally, the Court stated, in the phrase which
may have sparked the tribal immunity doctrine, "without authorization from Congress, the Nation
could not then have been sued in any court; at least without its consent." Id.
56. 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
57. See id. at 512. In USF&G, the Court held that an Indian tribe was immune from a cross-
NOTESNo. 2]
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of Indian law in Santa Clara Pueblo, oft cited as declaring that immunity
can be waived if unequivocally expressed. 8 Finally, the Court recently
reaffirmed the doctrine in Manufacturing Technologies, while at the same
time questioning the foundation on which it is based and the need for its
continued practice."
1. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
In Santa Clara Pueblo the Court faced the issue of whether the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) waived the tribe's immunity from suit in a case of
sexual discrimination brought by a tribal member.' The Court held that
absent an "unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent," tribal
sovereign immunity bars against suit under the ICRA.6" The Court reasoned
that since tribes have long-held immunity from suit, subject only to the
plenary power of Congress, any waiver of immunity could not be implied,
but must be unequivocally expressed.' Accordingly, the Court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals.'
2. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies
The Supreme Court clarified its present position on the doctrine of tribal
immunity in Manufacturing Technologies." The issue on appeal from the
claim absent congressional consent. See id. at 512 515. The Court reasoned that Indian immunity
from suit existed through the United States and remained until Congress expressed otherwise. See
id. at 512-13. Further, the Court found consent to suit dependent on an affirmative statutory
source and enunciated judicial power void without such consent. See id. at 514. Moreover, the
Court declared both Indian Nation and United States officials unable to waive immunity. See id.
at 513. Pointing out to allow so "would subject the Government to suit in any court in the
discretion of its responsible officers." Id. Finally, the Court issued the summation that "without
legislative action the doctrine of immunity should prevail." Id. at 514.
58. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
59. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
60. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58. Respondents filed suit in response to a tribal
ordinance which embraced a patriarchal membership plan. See 1d. at 52-53. The ordinance
provided that children whose father was a tribal member and mother was not a tribal member
would also be tribal members, but that children whose mother was a tribal member and father was
not a tribal member would not be tribal members. See id. at 53 n.2. Respondents contended that
the ICRA, enacted to prevent this type of discrimination, implied a waiver of tribal immunity for
this kind of action. See id. at 58.
61. See id. at 59. The Court also quoted USF&G that "'without congressional authorization,'
the 'Indian Nations are exempt from suit.'" Id. at 58 (quoting USF&G, 309 U.S. at 512). This
raised questions for the lower courts down the road as to whether tribes themselves could waive
immunity without consent from Congress. See infra notes 75, 92, 129 and accompanying text.
62. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392
(1976), and quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1 (1969)).
63. See id. at 72. The court quickly determined that tribal immunity had not been waived,
but then embarked on an extensive examination of the legislative history to determine whether
Congress intended for officers of the tribe to be subject suit. See id. at 60-72.
64. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
AA--
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Oklahoma Court of Appeals was whether an Indian tribe could be subject to suit
for breach of contract in state court if the parties executed the contract off
reservation land.' The Court held that "tribes enjoy immunity from suits on
contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities
and whether they were made on or off a reservation."' In reaching its
decision, the Court firmly reiterated that an Indian tribe enjoys immunity from
suit, unless Congress expressly authorizes suit or the tribe waives its
immunity6 Furthermore, the Court rejected Manufacturing's argument to
"confine" Indian sovereign immunity if the tribal activities take place outside
Indian country, or when the activities are commercial rather than
governmental because none of its precedents drew such a distinction."
In addition, the Court veered from its legal endorsement of tribal immunity,
which it considered well-settled through judicial precedent, and raised questions
in regard to the reasoning of the tribal immunity doctrine's historical
foundation." Moreover, the Court suggested that tribes no longer require
immunity to promote tribal self-governance and immunity from suit may no
longer be fair! ' However, although the Court recognized that the judiciary
65. See idL
66. Id. at 760.
67. See id. (citations omitted).
68. See id at 754 (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 167 (1977)
(Puyallup III)).
69. See id. at 760. The Court also cited its decision in Oklahoma Tax Commission. See id.
at 755. In Oklahoma Tax Commission the Court determined whether tribal sovereign immunity
barred Oklahoma from collecting a cigarette tax on goods sold at a reservation store. See Okla.
Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991). The Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that the Potawatomi Tribe did not waive its sovereign
immunity by seeking an injunction against the Tax Commission's assessment. See id. at 509-10.
A reaffirmation of USF&G. See id. at 509. However, the Court also reversed in part by holding
that sovereign immunity did not excuse the tribe from assisting in the collection of valid state
taxes on non-Indians. See id. at 512 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)). The Court further refused Oklahoma's request to limit the
doctrine of tribal immunity for tribal business activities or those occurring off reservation lands,
instead emphasizing the role of Congress in this regard. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S.
at 510-11.
70. See Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. at 756. The Court noted that the doctrine of
tribal immunity may have originated in Turner, it seemed to have "developed almost by accident."
ld. The Court found Turner, "at best, an assumption of immunity .... " but admitted that the
doctrine had been validated in subsequent decisions. Id. at 757 (citing United States v. USF&G,
309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940)).
71. See id. at 758. The Court stated the doctrine of tribal immunity at one time protected
tribal self-government from State encroachment. See id. However, in modem times tribes have
increasingly entered into commercial endeavors unrelated to internal government of its members.
See id. When a tribe enters into national commerce, the Court opined that "immunity can harm
those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity,
or who have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims." Id. The Court went on to
suggest that for these reasons the abrogation of tribal immunity may be the answer. See id.
No. 2] NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
shaped tribal immunity, the Court plainly chose to adhere to precedent and
clearly indicated any alteration of the doctrine must come from Congress.' In
light of this reasoning, the Court reversed the decision of the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals.'
B. Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity - United States Court of Appeals
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Clara Pueblo opposing
parties involved in tribal sovereign immunity suits felt secure that immunity
could be waived if unequivocally expressed by Congress 4 However,
uncertainty remained as to whether the Indian tribes themselves could waive
sovereign immunity and if so, what constituted a waiver.7
1. Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe
In Fontenelle, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
examined whether a "sue and to be sued" clause 6 in the Omaha Tribe's
72. See id. at 759. The Court compared tribal immunity with foreign sovereign immunity
and stressed that both are "a matter of federal law." See id. The Court then expressly deferred
to Congress the role of altering the existing tribal immunity doctrine. See id. at 758-59; accord
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 498 U.S. at 510. The source of judicial deference to Congress in Indian
affairs can be directly attributed to the Constitution, which gives Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, the source of congressional authority in Indian law also stems
from long-standing Supreme Court precedent. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58
(stating that "this aspect of tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to the superior and plenary
control of Congress"); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66 (1903) (holding that
Congress had long exercised plenary authority of the Indian tribes, generally by forming treaties,
but also which included the power to abrogate treaties); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
378-84 (1886) (holding it would stretch the meaning of the Constitution to rule Congress could
regulate criminal activities between Indians on tribal land under the Commerce Clause, but rather,
Congress had the authority since tribes were wards of the United States); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the regulation of Indian affairs rests solely with
the government of the union under the Constitution); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 32-33 (1831) (reaffirming that tribes were under the protection of the United States and could
not be considered foreign states under the Constitution); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 587-
88 (1823) (holding that the United States retains title of all Indian land through the doctrine of
discovery, subject only to their right of occupancy, which the United States could choose to
extinguish); see also FELIx S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122-23 (Univ. of
N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942) (discussing how Indian tribes have inherent sovereign powers
and Acts of Congress are limitations on that power, not the source of it).
73. See Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. at 760.
74. See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.
75. See DAVID H. GETcHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 386 (4th ed. 1998) (noting the
unresolved question left by USF&G of whether a tribe may waive immunity without
congressional consent); Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1058,
1060 n.20 (1982) (discussing the argument that tribes may not consent to suit without
authorization from Congress).
76. See Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315
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Corporate Charter opened the Tribe to a quiet title action.' The Eighth Circuit
held that the Tribe did consent to suit because the clause only expressed
exceptions to "sue and to be sued" for a "levy of any judgment, lien or
attachment."" The Omaha conceded that a quiet title action was none of
these." For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district
court.'
2. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe
In Merrion, the Jicarilla Tribal Council had adopted a severance tax
ordinance, in which the Tribe expressly consented to suit in federal district
court.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
Jicarilla Tribe 2 waived immunity pursuant to the severance tax ordinance.'
(10th Cir. 1982). The Tenth Circuit decided an action involving a "sue and be sued" clause in
the corporate charter of the Mescalero Apache Tribe in 1982. See id. at 319. The court held that
the Mescalero Apache constitutional entity (the Tribe) and corporate entity (Mescalero Apache
Tribe, Inc.) were separate and distinct. See id. at 320. Thus, the clause in the corporate charter
could not bind the constitutional entity to suit, since the contractor dealt exclusively with the
latter. See id.
77. See Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143, 145 (8th Cir. 1970). Congress allotted the
Omaha Reservation lands to individual tribal members after 1867. See id Plaintiffs predecessors
received trust and fee patents to the land, some of which lay along the Missouri River. See id.
After the Missouri River receded from its path over time, plaintiffs brought this quiet title action
against the Tribe and the United States as trustee in the United States District Court to claim the
uncovered land. See id.
78. See id at 147. The "sue and to be sued" clause reads as follows:
To sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within the United States;
but the grant or exercise of such power to sue and to be sued shall not be deemed
a consent by the said Tribe or by the United states to the levy of any judgment,
lien or attachment upon the property of the tribe other than income or chattels
specially pledged or assigned.
See id. The Corporate Charter had been approved by the Secretary of the Interior, which figured
prominently in the district court's reasoning that the United States had consented to suit. See id.
at 145.
79. See id. at 147.
80. See id. at 148.
81. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1980), afd, 455
U.S. 130 (1982). The Tribe also consented to suit in the Jicarilla Apache Tribal Court, but only
for the determination of the taxes legality. See id. The pretrial order read in part: "[The Tribe]
waived any claim to sovereign immunity for the determination of the legal validity of this tax."
See id. at 540 n.2.
82. See id. at 539. The Jicarilla Tribe occupies an executive order reservation in
northwestern New Mexico. See id. In 1968 the Tribal Council, as the legislative body of the
Tribe, adopted a revised constitution pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, §§ 16,
17; 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (1994), which the Under Secretary of the Interior approved in 1969.
See Merrion, 617 F.2d at 539. Section I(e) of the revised constitution gave the Tribe the power
to "enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, to impose taxes and fees
on non-members of the tribe doing business on the reservation." See id.
83. See id. at 540.
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In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that Congress encouraged
tribes to provide for their own welfare under the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 and found the Tribe's ordinance a clear attempt to do so."' The court
reasoned that the congressional grant of power in the Act sustained the Tribe's
express waiver of immunity from suit under the ordinance, especially since it
had been approved by the Secretary of the Interior.' Consequently, the Tenth
Circuit "reversed and remanded with direction to enter judgment in favor of
appellants."' The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the ruling.'
3. United States v. Oregon
In Oregon the Yakima Indian Nation appealed the United States District
Court's injunction banning it from fishing for chinook salmon in the Columbia
River." The Yakima Tribe contended primarily on appeal that it had not
waived immunity from suit and therefore, the district court erred by ruling
against it.89 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first
held Indian tribes may consent to suit without express waiver of immunity
from Congress? ° The court based its decision on precedent and policy.9 In
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 549.
87. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982) (examining the
Jicarilla's inherent power to tax within its jurisdiction and whether it violated the Commerce
Clause, but not addressing waiver of sovereign immunity).
88. See United States v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 1982). The district court's
ban on the spring chinook salmon run actually affected tribal fisheries in the State of Washington,
which had intervened as of right in 1974. See id. at 1011-12. The district court issued the ban
because it found that "irreparable harm" would be done to the salmon species if every fish were
not able to spawn. Id. at 1012. Indian tribes hold their right to hunt and fish second to none and
have defended those that right vigorously in the courts. See generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (holding that the Chippewa Indians retained the
rights to hunt, fish and gather on ceded land in present-day Wisconsin and Minnesota because
the United States guaranteed those rights in an 1837 treaty); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983) (holding that the application of the State of Mexico's hunting
and fishing laws to reservation lands is pre-empted); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
566-67 (1981) (holding the Crow Tribe may not regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on
reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe).
89. See Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1012. The district court first entered judgment in 1969
enjoining the State of Oregon from enforcing fishing regulations on the Yakima Tribe. See id.
at 1011. After Washington intervened both sides sought modifications to the original order on
at least five occasions. See id. at 1011 n.2. In 1977 the parties signed a conservation agreement
setting escapement goals for the spring chinook. See id. at 1011. "The parties agreed to tender
to the Oregon district court any dispute incapable of a negotiated resolution." Id. The 1977
agreement reads in part: "[I]n the event that significant management problems arise from this
agreement that cannot be resolved by mutual agreement, the parties agree to submit the issues to
federal court for determination." Id. at 1016.
90. See id. at 1014.
91. See id. at 1013.
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its ruling, the court noted the "Supreme Court has expressed clearly its
position" on whether Indian tribes have the power to waive immunity.9
Additionally, the court felt that since Indian tribes retain powers of self-
determination, it would be inconsistent with the power of sovereign immunity
if the tribes could not waive that right.93 Furthermore, the inability to waive
immunity would adversely affect tribes in their business dealings since non-
Indians would avoid contracting.'
Once the Ninth Circuit determined that an Indian tribe could waive
immunity without express consent from Congress, the court proceeded to
whether the Yakima Tribe had waived immunity.3 The appellees contended
the Tribe waived immunity both by intervening in the original suit and
consenting in the 1977 agreement to submit all fishing disputes to the district
court." The Ninth Circuit held the Tribe waived immunity under both
theories.'
The court noted an intervener subjects itself to the full adjudication of the
federal court on the litigated issues." In this instance the litigated issue
involved fishing rights and the Yalima would have been bound by the district
court's injunction had one been issued when the Tribe originally intervened."
Therefore, since the Tribe sought equitable relief in the federal courts, it risked
an equitable judgment adverse to its position.'" The Yakima, however,
argued that its intervention paralleled the counterclaim heard by the Supreme
Court in USF&G. °' On that basis the Tribe contended that by joining the suit
it risked nothing, because shielded by sovereign immunity, "it was entitled to
an injunction in its favor or no relief at all."'"
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Tribe's analogy to USF&G because the
argument did not recognize the likeness between this case and an action in
rem.' 3 Under such an action the district court, retaining custody of the res,
92. See id. (citing Turner, 248 U.S. at 358; Puyallup III, 433 U.S. at 173). The court also
cited previous circuit court decisions in Merrion, Fontenelle, and Maryland Casualty. See id. The
Tribe argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Clara Pueblo showed that only Congress
could waive immunity. See id. at 1015 n.14. But the Ninth Circuit distinguished Santa Clara
Pueblo as a question not whether the Tribe could waive immunity, rather whether Congress could
waive immunity by implication. See id. at 1015 n.14. "The issue of the tribe's retained power to
waive its own immunity simply never arose." See id.
93. See id. at 1014.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. (citing 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.16(6). at 24-671 (2d ed. 1981)).
99. See id. "The only difference here is the court retained post-judgment jurisdiction to
modify its decree." Id. at 1015.
100. See id. at 1015.
101. See id.; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. Oregon, 657 F.2d at 1015.
103. See id. (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
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has the power to enjoin a party from interfering with that custody."0° Thus,
the court determined that the district court had the authority to enjoin the Tribe
from fishing for salmon to protect the species."0 ' Finally, the court pointed
out that the dispute over fishing rights was exactly the type of dispute the Tribe
submitted resolution to the United States District Court in the 1977
agreement.'" The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of the preliminary
injunction." '
4. American Indian Agricultural Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe
In Standing Rock, the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal from the district
court involving tribal waiver in an action to recover on a promissory note.'0 '
The court examined whether Standing Rock could waive its sovereign
immunity through implication in a breach of contract action.'" ' The Eighth
Circuit held that overwhelming precedent alone required waiver of immunity
to be expressly and unequivocally stated."' The court then determined that
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 n.32 (1979)).
104. See id. The res in the district court's custody could be termed the fate of "all
anadromous fish spawning above the Bonneville Dam." See id. at 1011 n.3. The court opined
that here the resource sought to be protected by the Tribe, was the very one in danger. See id.
at 1015. Further, the court noted that "the existence of the salmon was inextricably linked to the
res in the court's constructive custody." See id.
105. See id. at 1016.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1017. The Oregon decision also contains the interesting subplot of Justice
Kennedy's (then Circuit Judge) authorship because he also penned the Manufacturing
Technologies opinion. See id. at 1010; Manufacturing Technologies, 523 U.S. at 753. Certainly
no inconsistency permeates the two opinions, rather its interesting because Oregon has been
considered to push the envelope of a tribe's express waiver, while Manufacturing Technologies
both affirms the tribal immunity doctrine, the tribe's power to expressly waive immunity - all
while questioning the very legal foundation immunity from which immunity derives. See infra
note 114 and accompanying text; see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
108. See Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d
1374, 1376 (8th Cir. 1985). The Consortium was a non-profit corporation made-up of fifteen
Indian tribes, including the Standing Rock Sioux. See id. at 1375. The Tribe borrowed $80,000
to relieve struggling member cattle ranchers, but did not establish a collection program, nor
initiate payments to the Consortium. See id. at 1376.
109. See id. at 1378. The note itself stated:
Mhe Bank may, in addition to such other and further rights and remedies
provided by law, (1) collect interest on the principle balance ... ; (3) hold as
security.., any property... delivered into the Bank... ; If this note is referred
to an attorney for collection .... all reasonable attorney's fees and other costs of
collection shall be added to such amount of principal and interest owfed] ... ;
This note and the rights and obligations of all parties hereto shall be subject to and
governed by the law of the District of Columbia.
See id. at 1376.
110. See id. at 1378. The court stated that under a standard of implied waiver it would have
no difficulty finding waiver in this action considering the language of the contract and the
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the clause at hand did not constitute an express waiver because "Standing Rock
did not explicitly consent to submit any dispute over repayment on the note to
a particular forum, or to be bound by its judgment."' In reaching its
conclusion, the court compared its case favorably with the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Ramey, thinking the plaintiff there had a stronger case."'
Additionally, the court rejected Consortium's appeal to the Oregon holding,
which it interpreted as requiring no specific verbal formula for waiver."' The
Eighth Circuit also noted the Yakima Tribe's consent to resolve disputes in the
federal district court, but continued to opine that Oregon "surely presses the
outer boundary of what the Supreme Court intended by its plain statement in
[Santa Clara Pueblo].""
The court rejected the argument that a requirement of an express waiver
hinders the Tribe's ability to contract with non-Indians."5 Furthermore, the
court felt that a "relaxation of the settled standard invited challenges to virtually
every activity undertaken by a tribe on the basis that the tribal immunity had
been implicitly waived.""' 6 Moreover, the court opined that any injustice
arising from the ruling did not stem from an express waiver standard, rather it
stretched from the doctrine of tribal immunity itself."' Finally, the Eighth
Circuit found that Standing Rock did not expressly waive immunity in this
instance because waiver must be construed narrowly and a finding of express
circumstances surrounding it. See id. at 1377.
111. Id. at 1380. The court concluded that it simply asked to much to find an express waiver
from the a vague rights and remedies provision, mention of attorney fees, and a choice of law
provision. See id.
112. See id. The Tenth Circuit in Ramey examined several contentions raised by Ramey
besides the "sue and be sued" clause. See Ramey, 673 F.2d at 319. Those contentions included:
(1) agreeing to an attorneys' fees clause in the contract; (2) entering into a loan
agreement with the Bank of New Mexico obligating the Tribe to 'duly pay and
discharge ... all claims of any kind.. .'; (3) submitting a certificate to the United
States Economic Development Agency stating that the contract documents
'constitute valid and legally binding obligations upon the parties.. '; (4) obtaining
payment and performance bonds from surety; [and] (5) consenting to partial
summary judgment with respect to the contract retainage.
Id. The court dismissed the first four grounds as an attempt to imply waiver where none had been
expressed. See id. The Tribe's consent to retainage could not act as a waiver in regard to the
other contentions, but only bound the Tribe to judgment in the amount of retainage withheld. See
id. at 320.
113. See Standing Rock, 780 F.2d at 1380.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 1379. The district court relied on this argument, on which the Oregon court
drew attention to as well. See i.d at 1378.
116. Id. at 1379.
117. See id. Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit foreshadowed some of the Supreme Court's
analysis in Manufacturing Technologies by declaring "it is to late in the day, and certainly beyond
the competence of this court, to take issue with a doctrine so well-established." Id.
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waiver from the provisions in this contract "simply asks to much.."".
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court."'
5. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
heard arguments on appeal from the district court on whether an Indian tribe
which filed an action may subsequently be subject to the cross-claim of an
intervening third party.' The D.C. Circuit held that the Wichitas did not
waive immunity to the cross-claim because they did not voluntarily become a
party to that claim - but were an indispensable party to its adjudication."'
In its analysis the court joined the other circuit courts which had found Indian
tribes capable of waiving immunity from suit." The D.C. Circuit vacated the
district court's ruling on the cross-claim because it should have been
dismissed."
C. Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Through an Arbitration Clause -
State Courts
The question of whether an arbitration clause in a contract between an Indian
tribe and a non-Indian constitutes a waiver of tribal immunity first arose at the
appellate level in 1983." The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this
118. Id. at 1380-81.
119. See id at 1381.
120. See Wichita & Affiliated Tribes v. Hodel, 788 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This
convoluted dispute arose in 1963 when the Secretary of the Interior returned 2306.08 acres of
land set aside for public use in 1891 to the Affiliated Bands. See it The remnants of the
Affiliated Tribes were three separate tribes - the Wichitas, the Caddos, and the Delaware Tribe
of Western Oklahoma - all parties to the suit. See id. The land soon produced income, which
a joint management group distributed equally to the tribes. See id. at 769. However, at the
Caddos urging the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) redistributed current and future
income relative to current population. See id at 769-70. The Wichitas filed an action seeking
review of the IBIA decision in federal district court. See id at 771. The Caddos and Delawares
intervened as party defendants. See id. The Caddos, the largest tribe designated a 51.13%
apportionment, filed a cross-claim seeking retroactive payments, which the Wichitas contended
they could not be affected by since they were immune. See id.
121. See id. at 774, 777-78. The court affirmed Oregon's holding by affirming that the
voluntary intervention by the Delawares and Caddos subjected them to the possibility of losing
"that which (they] already [possessed]." Id. at 773. But "since the Wichitas did not voluntarily
become a party to the cross-claim, and could not have been made a party against their will," the
court had to determine whether they were indispensable. Id. at 774. If the Wichitas and
Delawares were indispensable to the cross-claim, then it would have to be dismissed because they
had immunity from suit. See id. at 774. The court noted: "Immunity doctrines inevitably carry
within them the seeds of occasional inequities; in this case the Wichitas have used the courts as
both a sword and shield. Nonetheless, the doctrine of tribal immunity reflects a societal decision
that tribal autonomy predominates over other interests." Id. at 781.
122. See id. at 771-73.
123. See id. at 780-81.
124. See discussion infra Part III.C.I.
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issue in 2000.'" The majority of courts to hear the topic in the intervening
years determined, in about a two to one ratio, that an arbitration clause did
represent tribal consent to suit.'6
1. Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors
The Supreme Court of Alaska first heard arguments on whether an arbitration
clause signified an Indian tribes consent to suit.'" In Eyak, Native Village
contracted with GC to build a community center on land leased by the
Tribe.m On appeal Native Village argued that first, only Congress had the
power to waive tribal immunity; second, the arbitration clause was illegal
because the Secretary of the Interior did not approve the contract; and third, an
arbitration clause does not expressly and unequivocally waive tribal
immunity." The Supreme Court of Alaska held that Native Village waived
immunity to suit by agreeing to an arbitration clause in the construction
contract.13< The court determined that Indian tribes have the ability to waive
125. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
126. See discussion infra Part III.C., III.D.
127. See Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 757 (Alaska 1983).
128. See id. GC completed the construction, but Native Village did not make a final
payment of $13,745.98 due under the contract. See id. GC took its cause to an arbitrator pursuant
to the contract, who awarded GC the full payment. See id The arbitration clause read in part:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question between the Contractor and the
Owner arising out of, or relating to, the Contract Documents or the breach
thereof,... shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.... [Slhall
be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. The award
rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it
in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
See id. at 758.
129. See id. Approval of the Secretary of the Interior stems from 25 U.S.C. § 81, which
reads in part:
No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, .. . for the
payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in
prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him or any other
person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands....
unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows: ...
Second. It shall bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.
25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000). Congress amended the text of section 81 on March 14, 2000. Act of Mar.
14, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-179, § 2, 114 Stat. 46 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000)).
The amended statute reflects issues from Eyak, notably the definition of Indian lands and the
Secretary's approval. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(a)(l), (b) (2000). Congress now defines "'Indian lands"
as those "the title to which is held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe or lands the
title to which is held by an Indian tribe subject to a restriction by the United States against
alienation." Id. § 81(a)(1). Furthermore, the statute now reads "no agreement or contract with an
Indian tribe that encumbers Indian lands for a period of 7 or more years shall be valid unless that
agreement or contract bears the approval of the Secretary of the Interior .. " Id. § 81(b).
130. See Eyak, 658 P.2d at 761. The court assumed for the sake of argument that Native
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immunity without congressional authorization based on precedent."' Moreover,
the court also dismissed Native Village's second contention on the fact that the
construction took place on land leased from a third party."
In the court's determination of whether an arbitration clause constitutes
waiver, the court noted that no precedent had been cited by the parties, nor had
its independent research revealed any decisions on the issue." Forging ahead
the court opined "it is clear that any dispute arising from a contract cannot be
resolved by arbitration, as specified in the contract, if one of the parties intends
to assert the defense of sovereign immunity."'" The court felt that the terms
of a contract should be meaningful and immunity would render the arbitration
clause meaningless.'35 In conclusion, the court perceived little difference
between the agreement in Oregon - where the parties agreed any dispute
would be heard in the federal district court, and in this instance - where any
dispute would be decided through arbitration.'" The Supreme Court of Alaska
affirmed the judgment of the lower court based on that rationale.'"
2. Vab/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court
The Supreme Court of Arizona considered the next dispute to surface
involving an arbitration clause between an Indian tribe and non-Indian party in
Vat/Del. Val/Del appealed the ruling of the Pima County Superior Court's
dismissal of its complaint, which Val/Del brought pursuant to the arbitration
clause in the agreement with the Tribe after a dispute arose.'" The Supreme
Village qualified as a federal recognized Indian tribe in its review of the lower court's decision,
which did not consider the arbitration issue because it determined that Native Village was not a
recognized Indian tribe. See id. at 757-58.
131. See id. at 758-59. The court distinguished USF&G as a case deciding only the issue
of whether Indian tribes possessed immunity. See id. at 758. The court went on to give a
favorable analysis of Oregon and also noted the decisions of Ramey, Merrion and Fontenelle. See
id. at 759.
132. See iU. at 759-60. The court found that the land being lease did not qualify as "services
for Indians relative to their lands" as required by federal law. See id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 81
(2000)).
133. See id. at 760.
134. Id.
135. See id. (citations omitted).
136. See id. at 760-61.
137. See id. at 761.
138. See Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 502, 508 (Ariz. 1985). The court noted
that its independent research on this issue found only the Eyak decision. See id.
139. See id. at 503. The parties had entered into an agreement whereby Val/Del would
operate the Tribes new bingo operation. See id. The arbitration clause read as follows:
Arbitration. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract,
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the
action rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
[Vol. 25
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/11
Court of Arizona held that the agreement to arbitrate any dispute "in a court of
competent jurisdiction" expressly waived the Tribe's sovereign immunity.'
The court rejected the Tribe's argument that the language of the clause subjected
it only to an arlitration proceeding under the jurisdiction of the Pascua Yaqui
Tribal Court.' Rather, the court found no distinction between the various
courts pursuant to the language, and concluded that since the Tribe waived
immunity, any court had jurisdiction." The Supreme Court of Arizona then
vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded for further proceedings.'
D. Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity through an Arbitration Clause -
United States Court of Appeals
1. Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians
A few years after VaL/Del the Ninth Circuit was the first court to determine
that an arbitration clause did not constitute tribal waiver.'" The appeal
stemmed from a "Bingo Agreement" dispute between an Indian tribe and a
non-Indian contractor, in Pan American.' The sole issue before the court
was whether the arbitration clause signified the Sycuan Band's express waiver
of its sovereign immunity." The Ninth Circuit held that the arbitration
clause did not contain an "unequivocal expression of tribal consent" sufficient
Id. at 508. The trial court found that the Tribe had consented to arbitration in tribal court, but the
clause did not constitute sufficient waiver of immunity so as to give state courts jurisdiction. See
id. at 504.
140. U. at 509. In reaching its decision the court agreed with the rationale of Eyak that the
arbitration clause would me meaningless if it did not signify express tribal waiver. See id. at 508-
09. Moreover, the court favorably cited both Fontenelle and Oregon as indicators of the validity
of an agreement or contractual clause, in which a tribe consents to suit or submit the dispute to
a court with jurisdiction. See idU at 509.
141. See id.
142. See iat
143. See id. at 510.
144. See discussion infra Part III.D.I.
145. Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 417 (9th Cir. 1989).
Similar to VaD/Del agreement the parties agreed that Pan Am would construct and operate the
Tribe's bingo operation for a percentage. See id. Pan Am filed for breach of contract and sought
resolution through arbitration after the Sycuan Band passed a tribal ordinance, which effectively
raised Pan Am's expenditures $80,000 to continue with the operation. See id. The arbitrator
dismissed the claim and Pan Am subsequently filed a complaint in federal district court, which
the Sycuan Band moved to dismiss for lack of personal and subject matterjurisdiction and failure
to state a claim. See id. The district court dismissed Pan Am's claim for lack of jurisdiction
because it found the Tribe had not expressly waived immunity. See id.
146. See id. at 418. The arbitration clause reads in pertinent part:
[l]n the event a dispute arises between its parties ...either party may seek
arbitration of said dispute and both parties do hereby subject themselves to the
jurisdiction of the American Arbitration Association and do agree to be bound by
and comply with its rule and regulations as promulgated from time to time.
Id. at 419.
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to waive sovereign immunity as required by the Supreme Court in Santa
Clara Pueblo. 7 The court opined that an express waiver could only come
from the terms of the arbitration clause." Therefore, absent such a clear
textual waiver the courts have consistently declined to imply one, as Pan Am
essentially invited the court to do. 9
Additionally, the court specifically distinguished these circumstances from
those in its Oregon decision."s The court noted that not only had the
Yakima Tribe in Oregon subjected itself to suit by intervening, but it also
expressly agreed to submit future disputes to the federal district court by the
terms of the conservation agreement.' In contrast, the court eluded to the
fact that the Sycuan Band had "steadfastly denied the jurisdiction of both the
arbitrator and the federal court" to adjudicate Pan Am's claim.' The court
found that the Band's circumstances could in "no way be equated" with those
of the Yakima.'3 Thus, having found that the language of the arbitration
clause did not unequivocally express a waiver of tribal immunity, nor had the
Band subjected itself to suit as the Yakima in Oregon, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Pan Am's complaint."
2. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Construction Co. of South Dakota, Inc.
A few years later the Eighth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion from
Pan American.5 In Rosebud Sioux, the parties had entered into a $3.6
million construction contract on the Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservation.5
A dispute arose and the Tribe terminated the contract, after which Val-U
sought arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause." The federal district
court held that the arbitration clause did not constitute an explicit waiver of
sovereign immunity and Val-U appealed.'"" The Eight Circuit held that the
147. See id. at 419-20.
148. Seeid. at418.
149. See id. at 419. The court cited Merrion and Fontenelle as precedent where tribes had
expressly consented to suit, while citing Standing Rock and Ramey as examples where tribes had
not. See id. All of these references, however, clearly supported the court's understanding that
waiver must be unequivocally and expressly indicated. See id. at 418-19 (citing Santa Clara
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59).
150. See id. at 419.
151. See id
152. Id. at 420.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See discussion infra Part III.D.2.
156. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Constr. Co., 50 F.3d 560, 561 (8th Cir. 1995).
157. See id. The arbitration clause reads: "All questions of dispute under this Agreement
shall be decided by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of
the American Arbitration Association." See id at 562.
158. See id. The Tribe actually sued Val-U for breach of contract, as well as other various
claims, after it refused to participate in the arbitration. See id. at 561. Val-U pleaded the
arbitration clause as an affirmative defense, then responded with a counterclaim of its own for
[Vol. 25334
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/11
arbitration clause manifested a clear expression by the Tribe to waive its
sovereign immunity from any dispute arising under the contract.5 ' The court
admitted that the clause contained "spare" language, but also found it to be
"explicit" of the Tribe's intent to submit all disputes arising under the contract
to arbitration."6 Moreover, the court expressed its belief that the "simplicity
of the clause" does not undermine "its clarity or explicitness."''
Furthermore, the court particularly found the inclusion of the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, as the standard any arbitration proceeding
would follow, of significant importance." "Rule 47(c) of those rules states,
'Parties to these rules shall be deemed to have consented that judgment upon
the arbitration award may be entered in any federal or state court having
jurisdiction thereof.""'63  The court opined that by designating the
Association's rules as the forum for resolving disputes, the Tribe clearly
intended to waive its immunity to claims arising under the contract.'6'
In addition, the court recognized the "strong policy in support of tribal
sovereignty" and acknowledged the Santa Clara Pueblo rule that tribal waiver
cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed."~ However, the
court pointed out that the Supreme Court has never required an incantation
reciting "magic words" explicitly declaring "the Tribe waives its sovereign
immunity."" Finally, the court compared this waiver issue favorably with
its decision in Rupp v. Omaha Indian Tribe,6 noting that the Tribe in Rupp
affirmatively submitted to the district court's jurisdiction by requesting it to
compel the defendant's claims."l In contrast, the court distinguished its
decision in Standing Rock because there, the Tribe had not submitted the
repayment dispute to a specified forum, nor had it agreed to abide by any
judgment thereon." The arbitration rules provide both in this instance.'
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Val-U's breach of
breach of contract garnished with some side claims. See id. The district court did not rule on the
arbitration proceeding and it resulted in an award of $793,943.58 plus interest to Vat-U. See id.
Eventually, the court held the arbitration award unenforceable and dismissed all claims, except
for Vat-U's counterclaims arising from the breach of contract. See id. at 561-62. However, the
court found those counterclaims barred by the Tribe's immunity beyond the extent of recoupment,
from which the dismissal of the Tribe's complaint served to nullify. See id, at 562.
159. See ida at 563.
160. Id. at 562.
161. Id. at 563.
162. See id. at 562.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See id at 562-63.
166. Id. at 563.
167. 45 F.3d 1241 (8th Cir. 1995).
168. See Rosebud Sioux, 50 F.3d at 563 (citing Rupp, 45 F.3d at 1244).
169. See id. (citing Standing Rock, 780 F.2d at 1380-81).
170. See id.
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contract counterclaims and remanded to the district court.'
3. Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery
Associates, Inc.
In Sokaogon Gaming the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit considered an appeal from the federal district court ruling that granted
partial summary judgment to the Sakaogon Tribe."n The parties had agreed
on an architectural contract, which contained an arbitration clause, but a
dispute arose after the tribal leadership changed hands." The Seventh
Circuit held that the arbitration clause clearly manifested the Tribe's consent
to suit because it "specified arbitral and judicial fora for enforcement of the
rights conferred by the contract."74 The court found it "extremely
implausible" that the language of the clause could have "hoodwinked" an
unwary Indian negotiator into waiving tribal immunity. 15
On the contrary, the court interpreted the language to be as least as
understandable as the "magic word" phrase advocated by the Tribe.76 The
opinion noted that no court has required an explicit waiver of sovereign
171. See id. at 564.
172. See Sokaogan Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 656,
658 (7th Cir. 1996).
173. See id. TMI had received $150,000 in payment, but claimed to be owed another
$400,000. See id It sought arbitration, which the Tribe refused to participate in, receiving an
award of $500,000, then brought an action in state court to affirm the award. See id. The Tribe,
meanwhile, filed this claim in the United States District Court claiming it had not waived
immunity and thus, could not be bound by arbitration. See id The state action was stayed to
await the outcome here. See id.
174. Id. at 660. The court had to make an initial determination of whether the appeal fell
within the context of an immediate appeal, and found that it did. See id. at 658-59.
175. Id. at 659. Before embarking on its analysis of whether the arbitration clause here
constituted an explicit waiver, the court flirted with the argument that tribal waiver need not be
explicit at all. See id. at 659-60. The court draws attention to two separate lines of cases - one
asking whether Congress has waived tribal immunity and another inquiring whether the tribes
themselves have waived immunity. See id. at 659. The former descends from Santa Clara Pueblo
and requires explicit waiver, but the latter, often involving contract cases as in this instance,
seems to be based on an archaic and paternalistic notion that tribes need protection from devious
non-Indian contractors seeking to entice a tribal waiver of immunity. See id. The court expresses
its doubt as to the continued need of this protection, especially since a more stringent waiver
requirement may hinder tribal business by deterring non-Indian contractors from doing business
with the tribes. See id. at 660 (citing Amelia A. Fogleman, Note, Sovereign Immunity of Indian
Tribes: A Proposal for Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1364-65
(1993)). The policy argument that tribal immunity should be limited for the economic betterment
of the Indian tribes themselves is oft repeated, although rarely if it all by the tribes. See Amicus
Curiae Brief of Texas at 5-12, C&L Enters. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 377
(2000) (No. 00-292).
176. See Sokaogan Gaming, 86 F.3d at 660. The court noted the Tribal attorney argued that
waiver should only be found if the clause states: "The tribe will not assert the defense of
sovereign immunity if sued for breach of contract." Id.
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immunity to include the words "sovereign immunity," or thus be rendered
implicit.'" To bolster this rationale, the court points out that neither state
nor federal immunity waivers must contain the words "sovereign
immunity."'7 Rather, they both merely create the right to sue, as the
arbitration clause does here.'"
The court continued by demonstrating that its decision can be distinguished
with Standing Rock, since that clause did not specify "how rights were to be
enforced and remedies obtained."" Moreover, the court recognized the
blurred line separating implicit and explicit waiver language as evidenced by
the split between Rosebud Sioux and Pan American.'8 ' However, the court
made it known that this clause does not fall within that debate because it
expressly awards the right to sue without redirecting the reader to another
source of rules or law." On this reasoning the Seventh Circuit therefore
reversed the order granting partial summary judgment to the Tribe.'
IV. Analysis
This section of the note examines waiver of Indian sovereign immunity and
make a determination of whether an arbitration clause may constitute such a
waiver.' First, however, this note briefly argues that Indian tribes have the
power to waive sovereign immunity without authorization from Congress."5
Although an argument may have existed at one time based on USF&G, it
clearly has been overwhelmed by several decades of precedent.
Next this note argues waiver of tribal sovereign immunity should be
unequivocally expressed as stated in Santa Clara Pueblo." The argument
that Santa Clara Pueblo applies only to congressional waivers relies on an
177. Id.
178. Id. The Ninth Circuit specifically referenced the Tucker Act as one source to bolster
this statement. See id. That Act reads in part:
(I) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution .... or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States,.. . (2) The Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor,
including a dispute concerning termination of a contract, ...
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), (2) (2000).
179. See Sokaogon Gaming, 86 F.3d at 660.
180. Id. The specifically noted that it did not necessarily agree with Standing Rock, only that
it could be distinguished. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. The right to sue in those clauses had to be inferred by referencing the arbitration
rules unlike here. See id.
183. See ia4 at 661.
184. See discussion infra Part IV.
185. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
186. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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improper reading of the context of the statement." Regardless, the standard
has consistently been cited by the lower courts evaluating tribal waiver and
should be maintained. Finally, the Court, in Manufacturing Technologies,
correctly noted that Congress is better equipped to evaluate policy arguments
to limit Indian sovereign immunity."' Any limitation of the doctrine by
endorsing an implied waiver standard should be left for Congress as well.
Third, this note argues tribal waiver cases may be divided into two separate
categories - those with procedural waivers; and those with textual
waivers." Oregon contained both types." However, the Ninth Circuit
should not have found a procedural waiver based on the Yakima's
intervention, but correctly found a textual waiver based on the Tribe's
submission to the district court.'' Additionally, Standing Rock correctly
required within the text a specified forum to resolve disputes and submission
to judgment therein in order to find a waiver."
This note also argues that Pan American properly ruled a generic
arbitration clause - with no mention of the Indian tribe; no specified forum
to resolve disputes; and no submission to judgment therein - does not
unequivocally express waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.93 The state
courts in Eyak and VaL/Del relied too heavily on the Oregon decision and
incorrectly afforded greater deference to the provision in a generic contract,
than ensuring tribal immunity had been expressly waived."9 Similarly,
Rosebud Sioux and Sokaogon Gaming, although correctly recognizing waiver
does not require specific "magic words," missed that it does require specific
textual references to distinguish a generic arbitration clause from a tribal
waiver clause.'95
Consequently, this note argues the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma correctly
refrained from finding an unequivocally expressed waiver in the arbitration
clause of Citizen Band Potawatomi H." The clause, although clearly
written, gave no indication of waiver beyond Citizen Band's willingness to
sign the contract, which alone could not be interpreted as an expressed
indication of waiver from suit.
Finally, this note proposes referencing three factors in an arbitration clause
to effectuate a valid waiver of tribal immunity.9 7 First, the clause should
187. See discussion infra Part IV.B.I.
188. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
189. See discussion infra Part IV.C.I.
190. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
191. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
192. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
193. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.a.
194. See discussion infra Part IV.D.I.
195. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
196. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3.
197. See discussion infra Part 1V.E.
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identify the tribe waiving immunity to ensure it is not simply a generic form
commonly used by non-Indian parties. Second, the clause should contain a
specified forum under which any disputes or claims may be resolved. Finally,
there should be a submission to the judgment of the specified forum.
Inclusion of these three factors will ensure tribal waiver has been
unequivocally expressed."
A. Indian Waiver of Immunity - USF&G
There may have been a dispute at one time whether Indian tribes had the
authority to waive their sovereign immunity, but this section of the note will
clearly show the question has been resolved in favor of tribal waiver because
precedent alone wins this argument."9 The USF&G ruling now represents
only a link in the line of cases that developed the doctrine of tribal
immunity.a
To be sure, a legitimate argument did exist based on USF&G, then
subsequently Santa Clara Pueblo, that tribes did not have the authority to
waive their immunity.' The opinion in USF&G repeatedly referred to the
role of Congress as the source of waiver, utilizing language such as the
suability of the United States and the Indian tribes "depends" on authorization
from Congress, or tribes have no exemption from suit "without" statutory
waiver. More importantly, unlike Santa Clara Pueblo where the parties
argued whether an affirmative statutory waiver had been expressed, the issue
in USF&G centered on a procedural contention.
The Indian tribes picked up on this argument several decades later.'
Most notably, the Yakimas advocated the argument, albeit unsuccessfully, in
Oregon. In the opinion Justice Kennedy trumped the Yakima's contention by
citing to Turner as precedent that tribes had the authority to waive immunity,
ironically to the very phrase he later used in Manufacturing Technologies to
discredit the foundation of tribal immunity itself.' Native Village also used
the argument, again unsuccessfully, in Eyak citing directly to USF&G.' In
response to the argument, the Supreme Court of Alaska incorrectly stated that
the Court did not address waiver of immunity.' In fact, the Court had to
rule on the contention that a failure to object to the state court's jurisdiction
over the cross-claim constituted waiver thereof. The Court specifically
declared the sovereign immunity of both the United States and the Indian
198. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
199. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
200. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
201. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 70, 92 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
205. See Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 758 (Alaska 1983).
206. See United States v. USF&G, 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940).
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tribes could not be waived by officials.2
However, the Alaska Court rightly enunciated USF&G was really a
question of whether tribes had immunity from suit at all.' The Oregon
court cited more Supreme Court precedent than Turner alone to support its
arrival at a similar conclusion.' The Supreme Court without question
considered a tribe's ability to waive immunity a foregone conclusion by the
time of Oklahoma Tax Commission.2 " An argument may have existed at one
time that waiver required congressional authorization, but clearly no
longer."' Thus, USF&G should be recognized only as an important step in
the development of the tribal immunity doctrine, rather than precedent that
Indian tribes do not have authority to waive immunity.
B. Express or Implied Waiver
The plainly stated express waiver standard in Santa Clara Pueblo should
be maintained by the Court until altered by Congress 2" Further, the
Supreme Court correctly deferred to Congress on tribal immunity in
Manufacturing Technologies."3 Similarly, any weakening of that doctrine
with an implied tribal waiver standard should be left to Congress as well.'
1. Precedent for Express Waiver - Santa Clara Pueblo
The express tribal waiver standard enunciated by the Court in Santa Clara
Pueblo has been followed by the majority of the lower courts.25 That
standard should not be confined to merely a declaration of the congressional
waiver standard, as some courts would argue.2" ' Rather, it should continue
to represent the requirement for both congressional and tribal sovereign
immunity waivers.2 7 An implied waiver standard should not be adopted by
the Court because doing so would open the Indian tribes to suit on virtually
all of their activities and in effect, weaken the doctrine of tribal immunity to
the point that it should simply be eliminated.2 8
The argument that tribal waiver of immunity need not be unequivocally
expressed is similar to the one used by Indian tribes to claim immunity could
207. See id.
208. See Eyak, 658 P.2d at 758.
209. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text.
212. See discussion infra Part IV.B.I.
213. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
214. See discussion infra Part IV.B.I.
215. See supra notes 76-78, 110, 140, 147, 149, 159 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 62, 147 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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not be waived absent congressional authorization." 9 They both rightly argue
that Santa Clara Pueblo dealt specifically and only with whether Congress
intended to waive tribal immunity when it enacted the ICRA. The Court
did not even consider the question of whether the Indian tribes themselves
could waive immunity."' The Seventh Circuit seized on this distinction to
opine that two sets of waiver cases may be found - those in which Congress
limits tribal immunity and those in which tribes themselves limit
immunity.' The court further contended that in the latter cases, the only
purpose for requiring express waiver would be based on the archaic and
"paternalistic" purpose of protecting the Indian tribes.2 Certainly, it would
not be illogical to argue that since the Indian tribes depend on Congress for
the continued vitality of their sovereign immunity, waiver of such a significant
power through a third party would need to be expressly stated.' Likewise,
a reasonable inference could be drawn that the Indian tribe itself would not
require an express standard, since a tribe obviously could exercise first-hand
control over its own transactions and dealings.
This argument, however, relies on an improper reading of the plain
statement in Santa Clara Pueblo.' Although Part III of that opinion
unquestionable focuses on whether Congress unequivocally expressed waiver
of tribal immunity, the sentence setting the standard should be read as a
general declaration in the context writtenY6 The counter argument also has
not recognized that the phrase originated in King, which dealt with whether
the United States had waived sovereign immunity from suit.' The Court
specifically stated "jurisdiction to grant relief depends wholly upon the extent
to which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit and that
such a waiver cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed."'
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court directly quoted this phrase and it clearly
indicates that the sovereign itself may only waive immunity if unequivocally
expressed.'
Additionally, the unequivocally expressed standard has been adhered to by
the circuit courts.' The Ninth Circuit in Pan American stated succinctly
219. See supra Part IV.A.
220. See supra Part III.A.I.
221. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
223. Sokaogan Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d 656,659
(7th Cir. 1996).
224. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
227. See King, 395 U.S. at 1.
228. Id. at 5.
229. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 76-78, 110, 140, 147, 149, 159 and accompanying text.
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"[wihile Oregon's finding of waiver probably tests the outer limits of Santa
Clara Pueblo's admonition against implied waivers, several post-Oregon Ninth
Circuit cases have reaffirmed the principle that tribal consent to suit must be
unequivocally expressed.'"" The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also
subscribed to the Santa Clara Pueblo standard. In any event, none of
these courts have had trouble finding that tribes expressly waive immunity
from suit giVen the right circumstances. 3
Finally, any weakening of the express standard would increase suits in this
area of the law because an implied standard necessarily rests in no-man's-land.
In this area of uncertainty Indian tribes and non-Indians would litigate to
determine whether just about any activity entered into by tribes would
constitute consent to suit.' However, since the Court has endorsed the
doctrine of tribal immunity, sapping its strength to this extent should be left
to Congress. 5
The unequivocally expressed standard of sovereign immunity waiver set
forth in Santa Clara Pueblo should not be abandoned because the counter
argument rests upon a misreading of that case, the three western circuits have
all consistently applied the standard, and to do so would weaken the doctrine
of tribal immunity to the point where it should be abandoned entirely.'
2. Policy Arguments for Congress - Manufacturing Technologies
The policy arguments on whether tribal sovereign immunity should be
limited by adopting an implied waiver standard are better left for Congress,
as the Supreme Court stated in Manufacturing Technologies, because it holds
a better position than the judiciary to evaluate such a sweeping change in the
structure of Indian affairs. 7 Policy arguments for and against an implied
waiver standard would be broad in their scope. Indian tribes would argue
sovereign immunity has become a symbol of their ability to self-govern, a
concept which Congress has overseen and in the modem Indian era
supported." However, Indian tribes have increasingly entered into non-
government related commercial endeavors such as resorts, casinos or logging,
which often may be conducted through a separate tribal business entity and
more frequently done of reservation land, as in Potawatomi 11."9
Another oft repeated policy argument is that limiting tribal immunity from
suit would actually benefit the tribes in their business transactions because
231. Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1989).
232. See supra notes 76, 108-19 and accompanying text.4
233. See supra notes 76-107 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
237. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/11
non-Indians would not be deterred by the spectre of tribal immunity.2"
Indian tribes, as well, have at least recognized some aspects of the argument
as evidenced by "sue and be sued" clauses in their corporate charters."'
Congress has limited sovereign immunity in the past when it felt policy
considerations so required. 2 In addition, the Court has consistently deferred
to Congress in the past on questions related to Indian affairs. Any relaxation
of the express waiver standard used to evaluate tribal immunity should be left
for Congress as well.
C. What Constitutes a Waiver
Indian waiver of immunity cases may be divided into two different
categories - those involving procedural waivers; and those involving textual
waivers, usually in the form of a contract. 3 The Ninth Circuit, in Oregon,
correctly ruled the Yakima consented to suit in the textual waiver.2" The
Eighth Circuit's decision in Standing Rock also rightly concluded the Standing
Rock had not unequivocally expressed waiver of immunity.s
1. Procedural and Textual Waivers
The circuit courts have generally heard Indian waiver arguments in
procedural and textual contexts.2 In procedural cases Indian tribes are
usually already a party to a lawsuit that has a designated forum.' This was
the case in USF&G, Oregon and Wichita. In those cases, the opposing side
argued the Indian tribes had consented to suit since they were in or had
entered the lawsuit. A procedural waiver claim rests on a higher degree of
implication than a textual case, even if evaluated under the express waiver
standard of Santa Clara Pueblo, because it necessarily must rely, at least in
part, on the assumption that the Indian tribe waived immunity by becoming
a party to the suit."
Textual waivers differ in that the Indian tribe and non-Indian party have
negotiated a written agreement. The Indian tribe has not become party to a
suit and therefore consent nust be expressly found in the language of the
textual agreement.2 9 A valid textual waiver should expressly refer to the
tribe waiving suit and specify the jurisdictional forum.' Because the
240. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
243. See discussion infra Part IV.C.I.
244. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
245. See discussion infra Part IV.C.3.
246. See supra notes 76-123 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 57, 88-107, 120-23 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 76-87, 108-19 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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circumstances of the parties in procedural and textual waivers significantly
differ, any finding that an Indian tribe procedurally waived immunity should
not be construed as precedent that a textual waiver should be anything but
unequivocally expressed. 1
2. Oregon
Although Oregon has been criticized for pushing the limits of the plain
statement required in Santa Clara Pueblo, the Ninth Circuit correctly found
the Yakima Tribe had consented to suit in the textual waiver. The court,
however, did not reach the correct decision by finding tribal waiver when the
Tribe intervened as a party to the suit.'
At first blush, it may seem inconsistent to argue textual waivers require
mention of three factors, then argue as well that the Yakima waived immunity
in its agreement. The textual waiver in Oregon submitted any problems
arising from the management agreement for determination by the federal
court. 3 It further stated that the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon retained jurisdiction over the case, in which the Tribe was a party.
However, the agreement made no mention of the Yakima Tribe "waiving
immunity" or "consenting to suit." The agreement did not require this because
the Yakima were parties in an ongoing suit and the agreement, therefore,
unquestionably pertained to the Tribe. Oregon was not a case where the
parties first initiated contact with each other by negotiating a contract, thereby
requiring a textual identification of the Tribe as a party. The agreement signed
by the Yakima was made under the ongoing lawsuit's sphere of influence, in
which the Tribe was a party. Additionally, the agreement does not specifically
state the parties submit to the judgment of the specified forumY5 However,
the agreement clearly endorses the jurisdiction of the federal district court the
most important aspect of sovereign immunity waiver. Likewise, because the
Yakima were already embroiled in the lawsuit as a party, a written declaration
submitting the issues to federal court for determination - dare it be said -
sufficiently implies consent to the judgment of the district court.
In contrast, the court's ruling that the Yakima procedurally waived
immunity by intervening implies all three factors necessary for an express
tribal waiver.' The court based its rationale on a procedural rendition of
intervening precedent, which essentially did not recognize the Tribe's status
as a dependent sovereign.' Similarly, the court compared the intervention
251. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
256. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
257. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
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to an action in rem, but again focused on the procedural working of such an
action involving non-Indian parties."8 In essence, the court inferred that
since a non-Indian party would be subject to the court's injunction under these
procedural theories, so would an Indian tribe possessing immunity from
suit. The Oregon intervention decision necessarily rested on an implied
standard of tribal waiver because it inferred the Tribe considered itself at risk
to suit and judgment of the district court by intervening.' ° A decision
resting entirely on implication cannot constitute a waiver under the plain
Santa Clara Pueblo statement.2'
3. Standing Rock
The Eighth Circuit in Standing Rock correctly determined no tribal waiver
had occurred by the terms of the promissory note.' The clause itself
contained references to attorney's fees, payments, rights and remedies, and
even a choice of law clause, but did not contain any of the three express
waiver factors.' These provisions in no way signified an express intention
of the Standing Rock to waive sovereign immunity because the clause could
not be distinguished from the language two non-Indian parties would have
used. If tribal waiver requires an unequivocal expression, then it stands to
reason that the terms of the a waiver clause should at least refer to the
sovereign as more than a generic party. Without a phrase identifying the
Standing Rock as a party consenting to the terms, the provisions in the clause
simply reflect an attempt, as in Ramey the court noted, to imply a waiver in
order to give every provision meaning.' Furthermore, the court correctly
noted that the choice of District of Columbia law clause did not equate to
determination in a specified forum, nor submission to judgment therein.
For the general law clause to be applicable the court would have had to imply
submission to the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts, but
jurisdiction must be unequivocally expressed.' The court rightly determined
that absent unequivocal expression of consent to suit in a specified forum and
submission to judgment therein, the Standing Rock could not have waived
sovereign immunity. 7
258. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note I10 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
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D. Arbitration Clause as Waiver
The Alaska and Arizona Supreme Courts erroneously afforded greater
significance to ensuring "meaning" in a single contract clause than recognizing
the gravity of waiving a sovereign power when they held an arbitration clause
constitutes tribal waiver of immunity.' Of the three circuit courts to decide
the arbitration issue, only the Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision ruling
an arbitration clause did not constitute an express waiver of tribal
immunity.' Finally, in Citizen Band Potawatomi II, the Oklahoma Court
of Appeals rightly declined to find an unequivocal expression of tribal waiver
in the arbitration clause of the contract between Citizen Band and C&L"7
1. State Courts
a) Eyak
The Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Eyak can only be described as
cavalier. Not only was the court the first to decide waiver of immunity
through an arbitration clause, but probably did not even need to address the
issue.!7 Rather than first make a determination of whether Eyak was a
federally recognized tribe, as the lower court had done thereby rendering the
arbitration issue moot, the court assumed "arguendo" Eyak's federal
recognition and forged ahead with a determination of waiver.'z In the
court's analysis it correctly cited the need for an unequivocally expressed
waiver as required by Santa Clara Pueblo.' The court further correctly
recognized the arbitration clause in the contract could not resolve the dispute
if one of the parties intended to assert sovereign immunity.27'
However, the court wrongly considered the coexistence of these conflicting
entities an impossibility, and consequently reasoned immunity had been
waived because the contractual clause should be found meaningful. This
flawed reasoning does not recognize that it is not possible to have a
meaningful arbitration clause unless the Indian tribe unequivocally expresses
waiver of sovereign immunity by the terms therein. 5 By holding an
arbitration clause waives tribal immunity, without even examining the terms
of the clause, the court erroneously professes an expressed standard when it
applies an implied standardY"
268. See discussion infra Part IV.D.I.
269. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
270. See discussion infra Part IV.D.3.
271. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
272. Eyak, 658 P.2d at 758.
273. See id at 760.
274. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 62, 148 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/11
No. 2] NOTES 347
Finally, the court erroneously found "little substantive difference" between
the textual clause in Oregon and the arbitration clause here' The court
failed to explain how a designation to a specific forum's jurisdiction equated
to resolution of a dispute under an arbitration clause, when it did not even
determine whether the clause designated a specific forum."8 The court also
failed to note the different circumstances of the parties when they entered into
the respective agreements.'
b) Val/Del
The Supreme Court of Arizona relied heavily on the Eyak decision, quoting
the analogy of the designated forum language in Oregon.' The court at
least examined the terms of the arbitration clause, but incorrectly found the
language "in any court having jurisdiction thereof' to constitute an express
waiver."' The problem with this generality is that no court has jurisdiction
to enforce the arbitration clause absent an unequivocal expression by the
tribe.' In order to ensure the arbitration clause doubles as a sovereign
immunity waiver clause it must be distinguishable from the everyday, run-of-
the-mill language used by two non-Indian parties. An unequivocally expressed
standard requires this specification. Otherwise the Pasqua Yaqui correctly
viewed this clause for what it was - a generic arbitration clause no different
from one between non-Indian parties - and therefore unenforceable against
them because of their immunity from suit."
2. United States Court of Appeals
a) Pan American and Rosebud Sioux
The arbitration clauses in Pan American and Rosebud Sioux do not contain
a catch all jurisdiction provision like Vat/Del and Sokaogon Gaming - and
more importantly Citizen Band Potawatomi IL Oddly enough, both courts
reach unexpected conclusions in light of their previous rulings in Oregon and
Standing Rock. Even so, both decisions are very relevant to a determination
of the issue at hand. 5
The Ninth Circuit correctly did not find an "affirmative textual waiver" of
tribal immunity in the arbitration clause in Pan American because the limited
277. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 98-102, 127-37 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 62, 111 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 17, 181-82 and accompanying text.
285. See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.a.
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language could not meet the unequivocally expressed waiver standard.' An
"affirmative textual waiver" ensures a tribe has expressly stated its intent to
waive immunity within the terms of the clause. The court further notes
that tribal immunity remains intact until surrendered in an unequivocally
expressed statement as required by Santa Clara Pueblo. This recognizes
that consent by implication through a generic clause cannot clear an express
standard. The court also rightly notes that Indian sovereignty is not a
discretionary doctrine, hostage to an equitable outcome of the bargaining
process."9 The outcome of a tribal waiver case should focus only on
whether the Tribe waived immunity, not on any inequitable result if waiver
is not found.'
The Eighth Circuit arrived at the polar opposite of the Ninth Circuit, in
Rosebud Sioux." Despite acknowledging that tribal waiver can only be
found under the Santa Clara Pueblo standard, the court found a one sentence
arbitration provision - which contained no mention of the tribe or even a
catch-all jurisdiction reference - unequivocally expressed the Tribe's waiver
of immunity.29 The court justified the unspecified jurisdiction problem with
the arbitration provision's reference to Rule of the American Arbitration
Association, which provides a forum in state or federal court. 3
However, referencing the AAA Rules poses several problems. All of the
arbitration clause cases contain a reference in the text to the Rules of the
AAA, except Eyak which did not examine the text of its clause.' The fact
that all the clauses contain a reference to these Rules plainly shows the
generic nature of these agreements and emphasizes that consent to a common
arbitration clause in no way constitutes an express waiver of Indian immunity.
The Rules are certainly relevant to an arbitration clause, but lend no
credibility to finding Indian tribal waiver therein. In addition, not only does
the reference to the Rules emphasize the generic text of the arbitration clause,
but the court's argument completely distorts the Santa Clara Pueblo
standard. 5 An unequivocally expressed Indian waiver simply cannot be
found by reading a one sentence arbitration provision, which then references
the reader to another source for a designation of jurisdiction - neither of
286. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
288. See Pan Am. Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, 884 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir.
1989).
289. See id.
290. See id
291. See supra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 17, 139, 146, 157, 181-82 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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which provides any mention of an Indian tribe.' In fact, the casual observer
or curious law student would not even know by reading either of these
sources that an Indian tribe was even involved, let alone that it expressly
waived immunity from suit.'
Finally, the court correctly notes the Supreme Court has never required the
"magic words" - this Indian tribe waives immunity; but too quickly
dismisses the idea that an express standard does require certain textual
references There is nothing magical about conjuring a reference to the
Tribe "agreeing," "consenting," or "submitting" to arbitration within the text
of the clause. Nor would any witchcraft be afoot if the clause called for a
pinch of specified forum. These are very mundane factors. Textual
requirements that clearly indicate an Indian tribe's waiver of sovereign
immunity through arbitration should not be dismissed as hocus pocus. Rather,
they should be included to ensure all parties understand an unequivocally
expressed tribal waiver has occurred.'
b) Sokaogon Gaming
In Sokaogon Gaming, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted an
arbitration clause nearly identical with the one in Val/Del.' The court
correctly found nothing ambiguous about the text of the clause' However,
the court did not recognize the unambiguous language made no reference to
an Indian tribe, let alone "waiving immunity," "agreeing to arbitration," or
"consenting to suit," nor did it name a specific forum to submit the
dispute." Certainly, everything in the clause was clearly written and
expresses the desire of non-Indian parties to subject themselves to
arbitration.3" But a clearly written arbitration clause, without reference to
an Indian-tribe or a specified forum with jurisdiction over disputes, should not
be considered an unequivocally expressed waiver of Indian sovereign
immunity.3
Furthermore, the court rightly rejected the Tribe's argument that any waiver
must contain the words "sovereign immunity."' In doing so the court notes
the Tucker Act, which does not require the federal government to say
"sovereign immunity" in a waiver.0 The Tucker Act does, however, directly
296. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 157, 161-64 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
299. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
300. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
302. See Sakaogan, 86 F.3d at 659.
303. See i.
304. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
305. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
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identify the United States as a party and specifically designates the United
States Court of Federal Claims as the forum with jurisdiction to hear contract
claims.
3. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
In a frugal analysis, the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma correctly held
Citizen Band did not waive sovereign immunity in the arbitration clause.'
The clause was essentially the same as those in Va iDel and Sokaogon
Gaming - agreement to submit disputes to arbitration; in accordance with
Rules of the AAA; any court having jurisdiction thereof - but the court
specifically chose not to charge after the Alaska Supreme Court, in Eyak,
declined to find tribal waiver.' By not finding a waiver from a clearly
stated arbitration clause, the court recognized the need for specific terms
relating to the Indian tribe under an express waiver standard.' A mere
"willingness" on the part of the Tribe to arbitrate required an implied leap to
tribal waiver2 The court correctly recognized tribal waiver must be
unequivocally expressed.
E. An Arbitration Clause Must Reference Specific Factors to Constitute an
Unequivocally Expressed Tribal Waiver
In order to constitute an unequivocally expressed tribal waiver of sovereign
immunity an arbitration clause must contain an affirmative textual reference
to three factors - identifying the Tribe involved; specification of a forum;
and submission to judgment therein. There need not be a requirement to say
the "magic words," but it is necessary to reference the "magic factors. 011
Doing so will ensure a generic arbitration clause is never confused with an
expressed Indian waiver of sovereign immunity.
First, a textual waiver should contain a clear indication of the Indian tribe
involved. If the parties simply added a reference to the tribe somewhere in
the clause, it would transform the entire context from a generic arbitration
agreement, to a recognition of one party's unique status. For example, by
inserting the words "Citizen Band Potawatomi Nation agrees" at the beginning
of the arbitration clause between Citizen Band and C&L, the provision now
expressly indicates the Tribe's presence to the proposed arbitration."' A
clause, which in all respects appears no different than an agreement between
307. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 41-42, 139, 302 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 166, 176 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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two non-Indian parties, should not be construed as an unequivocally expressed
waiver of sovereign immunity."'
Second, and most importantly, sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional issue
and any waiver must designate a specific forum where the dispute will be
resolved."" A general forum specification in an arbitration clause is a
hollow provision to an Indian tribe because courts generally do not have
jurisdiction over it without tribal waiver of immunity."' However, in the
right context, a general forum designation would suffice, for example, in the
"sue and be sued" clause of Fontenelle, since the Omaha unilaterally
consented to suit with all future parties in the corporate charter. '16 A general
jurisdictional provision in this context could not be mistaken for a general
forum provision in an agreement between non-Indian parties."7 Finally, the
waiver should contain a submission to the judgment of the specified
forum. t This requirement is less important and under certain circumstance
may blend in with the specified forum element.319
An endorsement of these three factors would ensure an arbitration clause
also was intended as an unequivocally expressed Indian waiver of sovereign
immunity.
V. Conclusion
Nothing in this note should be read to indicate tribal waiver of immunity
cannot be effectuated through an arbitration clause. However, a generic
arbitration clause stuck into a construction contract, which in no way differs
facially from that used by two non-Indian parties, should not be considered
an express waiver of Indian sovereign immunity simply because it has the
tribe's signature. The clause should identify the tribe waiving immunity and
specifically designate a forum that will have jurisdiction over disputes arising
from the contract. Obviously, the endorsement of an express waiver standard
is crucial to this argument. If the Supreme Court adopts an implied waiver
standard, then an arbitration clause would constitute waiver of immunity.
However, such a significant change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity
should be left for Congress.
313. See supra notes 17, 139, 146, 157, 181-82, 302-03 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 62, 111 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
No. 2] NOTES
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol25/iss2/11
